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Introduction
All federal and many state checkoff organizations are
required to perform evaluations of the effectiveness of
their programs periodically. Although some program
managers conduct evaluations primarily to satisfy legisla-
tive requirements, most recognize the importance of accu-
rate and detailed evaluations of the effectiveness of past
promotional activities for successful management of their
programs.
Program evaluation usually is thought of as the mea-
surement of program effectiveness; that is, the “metrics”
needed to determine how much “bang for the buck” has
been generated by the promotion and research, as well as
other programmatic activities funded by the commodity
organization. In essence, the “metrics” are an after-the-fact
assessment of whether the organization funding the pro-
gram has been “doing things right;” that is, whether the
activities in which the organization has invested have been
successful in achieving their objectives.
Evaluation also includes an assessment of whether the
organization is “doing the right things;” that is, whether
the program goals and objectives and the process designed
to meet those goals efficiently and effectively lead to the
optimum allocation of the program funds. Even if all pro-
motion expenditures are found to generate positive
returns, the evaluation results may suggest some realloca-
tion of funds among alternative activities to maximize the
returns to the available funds.
Evaluation also has proven to be important in recent
court challenges to checkoff programs. As Crespi and
McEowen discuss in another article in this issue of Choices,
the constitutionality of many legislatively-mandated com-
modity programs has been challenged by some who are
required to pay as a violation of their First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech. Implicit in the arguments is
the question that program evaluations are designed to
answer whether the promotion and advertising programs
funded by checkoff funds are effective in securing the
anticipated benefits for those who pay for the programs.
Defining Checkoff Program Effectiveness
The first step in measuring program effectiveness is to
clearly define what “effectiveness” means to the checkoff
organization. Whether or not a promotion program can be
judged to be effective depends on the objectives of the pro-
gram. Even though the overall mission or goal of checkoff
programs is to enhance the profits of program contribu-
tors, most programs define intermediate objectives that
serve as indicators of program effectiveness, such as
changes in: (1) industry sales, (2) industry prices, (3)
industry market share, (4) industry profits, or (5) con-
sumer awareness of a product or of positive product
attributes.
Measurement Methods
Once specific indicators of effectiveness are identified, the
next step is selecting the appropriate measurement method
to match the indicators identified. The mechanism by
which a promotion program ultimately impacts the profits
of those who pay for the program often is thought to begin
with enhancing consumer awareness of the product or
product attributes, which is expected to change consumer
buying behavior and impact sales and prices which only
then will impact contributor profits. In schematic terms:
Promotion → Consumer Awareness → Sales/Prices → Con-
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Consequently, typical approaches to
measuring the effectiveness of check-
off programs generally fall into one of
three categories: (1) consumer aware-
ness studies, (2) retail sales impact
studies, and (3) contributor profit
studies. Effectiveness in one category
does not necessarily imply effective-
ness in other categories. For example,
the organization may increase con-
sumer awareness, but not increase
either retail sales or profits. By the
same token, increases in retail sales
may not necessary lead to increases in
industry profits.
Consumer Awareness Studies
A primary metric of program effec-
tiveness for many checkoff programs,
and particularly those in the early
stages of development, is the extent
to which promotion activities affect
consumer attitudes and awareness
concerning their commodities. Most
of what is known about consumer
attitudes/beliefs regarding specific
agricultural commodities has come
from "tracking" studies done by mar-
ket research firms for the correspond-
ing commodity promotion organiza-
tions. Consumer attitudes/beliefs
regarding specific characteristics of
the commodity of interest are
"tracked" over time through periodic
surveys of consumers. Improvements
in attitudes and changes in beliefs
consistent with the promotion mes-
sages over time are taken as evidence
that the promotion program is effec-
tive in boosting sales and, ultimately,
industry profit.
One problem with these types of
studies is that attitudes can be influ-
enced by several factors other than
the promotion program so that
changes in consumer attitudes/
beliefs, as indicated by “tracking
studies,” cannot always be confi-
dently attributed to the promotion
program. For example, even though
the "Other White Meat" message of
the U.S. pork industry by itself may
have had a positive effect on con-
sumer attitudes about pork, con-
sumer surveys might indicate no
change or even a negative change in
those attitudes/beliefs if public health
messages have simultaneously con-
veyed concerns about the health risks
of eating meat.
Even if the promotion success-
fully changes attitudes, there is no
guarantee that the attitude change
will translate into increased sales. As a
consequence, many researchers have
preferred to analyze the direct rela-
tionship between promotion expen-
ditures and sales without considering
whether the promotion had any
impact on consumer awareness or
attitudes. 
Retail Sales Impact Studies
Early efforts to measure the sales
impact of commodity promotion
programs relied largely on anecdotal
evidence and simple comparisons of
gross investments in promotion and
gross changes in sales. During peri-
ods of rapidly expanding markets and
rising prices, this approach can yield
some persuasive stories and even
more impressive upward-sloping
graphical relationships between pro-
motion expenditures and sales. The
problem with this approach is that
various factors other than the promo-
tion program affect the volume and
value of commodity sales, such as rel-
ative price changes, agricultural poli-
cies, changes in incomes, population
growth, competition from other
products, and consumer health con-
cerns and demographics, just to
name a few. The problem becomes all
too apparent in years when markets
turn down and prices drop. Program
managers find that taking credit for
rising demand and prices in good
years forces them to take the blame
for declining demand and prices in
bad years.
Over the years, increasingly
sophisticated statistical methods have
been developed to isolate and mea-
sure the unique contribution of pro-
motion programs to the performance
of commodity sales and the profit-
ability of the farm sector. Most com-
mon has been the use of econometric
models to statistically disentangle the
effects of promotion program activi-
ties on commodity sales and demand
from those of other market forces.
Even if the analysis indicates that
promotion programs have had a posi-
tive and statistically significant effect
on market sales, however, the ques-
tion remains as to whether the
increase has been greater than the
cost of the program. For that reason,
most checkoff organizations are more
interested in some measure of return
on investment (ROI) rather than the
effects of promotion on the level of
sales. Consequently, what most stud-
ies provide is some Aggregate Mea-
sure of the Effectiveness (AME) of
checkoff program activities. Unfortu-
nately, the AMEs estimated for
checkoff programs often are pre-
sented in different forms and calcu-
lated in different ways for different
commodities, which causes confu-
sion among researchers, as well as
among checkoff program managers
and stakeholders.
The most commonly reported
AME is the benefit-cost ratio (BCR),
which is typically calculated in retail
sales impact studies as the dollar
increase in sales per promotion dollar
spent (retail BCR). Because promo-
tion expenditures occur over time
and have different effects over their
life cycles, the increase in retail sales
generated by the program over time
often are discounted to present value
b e f o r e  d i v i d i n g  b y  t h e  c o s t  o f  t h e
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value of money. However calculated,
if the BCR is greater than one, the
promotion program is deemed “effec-
tive” because more than one dollar in
sales is generated for every dollar
spent. On the other hand, if the cal-
culated BCR is less than one, the
program is deemed “ineffective.” 
Because they provide measures of
the “average” return to promotion
activities, the usefulness of BCRs for
making promotion funding alloca-
tion decisions is limited. Thus, some
studies report a marginal rate of
return (MRR) as a more appropriate
ROI concept than a BCR as a mea-
sure of the advertising and promo-
tion effectiveness. A retail sales MRR
is usually calculated as the percentage
increase in sales revenues from a 1%
increase in promotion expenditures.
Thus, an MRR provides a more accu-
rate indication of the change in total
returns that might be expected from
a reallocation of funds among com-
peting promotion activities.
While BCR and MRR measures
provide some sense of whether a
checkoff program has effectively
increased retail demand and sales,
they provide no clear criteria for
judging whether the benefits of a par-
ticular advertising program have
exceeded the costs sufficiently to war-
rant continuation of the program.
How high must a BCR or MRR be
in order to justify a conclusion that
the program is “effective”? How high
is too high and how low is too low? 
Reported BCRs for checkoff pro-
grams typically range from about 2:1
to 10:1 (Williams & Nichols, 1998;
Kaiser et al., 2005). Does that mean
that a checkoff program with an esti-
mated BCR of 10:1 is 5 times more
effective than a program with a BCR
of 2:1? Are BCR estimates of 50:1 or
100:1 unreasonably high or are those
programs just that much more effec-
tive than programs with more typical
BCRs? How are we to interpret a
BCR for a checkoff program at the
bottom of or below the typical range?
Beyond indicating that the cost of a
checkoff program is greater than the
returns generated, is there any mean-
ingful difference between a BCR
between 0 and 1 and a negative
BCR? 
The problem is that a typical
benefit-cost analysis of a checkoff
program’s effectiveness fails to
address whether or not the program
is a “good” investment for those who
pay for the program. Even if the esti-
mated BCR from a particular adver-
tising program is estimated to be pos-
itive and even higher than those
estimated for other advertising pro-
grams, what program contributors
want to know is whether they could
do better with the funds they con-
tribute by investing in other com-
mon investment opportunities and
realizing an even higher return. If so,
then it would likely make little differ-
ence to them if the BCR from the
advertising program is “positive” if
they could keep their money and
invest it in other investment oppor-
tunities and realize a higher return.
For economists, this issue implies
that the fundamental concern in
measuring the effectiveness of check-
off programs probably should be the
opportunity cost of the checkoff pro-
gram funds from the collective
group. This issue has received rela-
tively little attention in the literature.
For program managers, the implica-
tion is that more relevant informa-
tion might be provided by economic
evaluations if researchers treated
checkoff programs as investment
alternatives and calculated how well
the various programs fare compared
to other investment opportunities
available … like buying land or
investing in Treasury Bills, etc.
The standard business method
for determining the highest yielding
investment opportunity is to calcu-
late the internal rate of return (IRR)
of the investment over time. In ana-
lyzing alternative business invest-
ments, the IRR often is referred to as
the discounted rate of return, the
marginal efficiency of capital, and the
yield of an investment. For measur-
ing the effectiveness of a commodity
promotion program, the IRR is cal-
culated as the change in the future
value of the estimated returns to the
promotion expenditures over time
divided by a change in the present
value of advertising expenditures
expressed in percentage terms. Con-
sequently, the IRR is a dynamic
return on investment measure that
expresses the estimated marginal
returns to promotion expenditures
(i.e., the percent change in returns
from a 1% change in promotion). 
In a recent study of the Florida
orange juice promotion program, the
IRR to Florida orange growers was
calculated to be 14.4% over the life
of the program (Williams, Capps, &
Bessler, 2004). In other words, for
Florida orange growers to have done
better with the funds they invested in
the orange juice promotion program,
they would have had to have found
an investment alternative that yielded
more than 14.4% on average annu-
ally over the entire 33-year period of
the program. Curiously, we tend to
use the IRR method for evaluating
investments in research that shift the
supply curve, but not for invest-
ments, like advertising, that shift the
demand curve.
Contributor Benefit Studies
A particular limitation of the retail
sales BCR and MRR measures is that
they are calculated assuming that
nothing, including prices, changes
when promotion expenditures76 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
change. Unless one is willing to
assume that all the benefits generated
in terms of increased retail sales are
captured dollar for dollar by produc-
ers who pay for the program, an
unlikely possibility, such measures are
not particularly meaningful as mea-
sures of the benefits of checkoff pro-
gram expenditures to those who pay
for the program. Thus, the relevant
questions are: (1) what portion of
any benefits from shifting the retail
demand curve accrues to those who
pay for the program? and (2) are
those benefits greater than the costs
of promotion? For this reason, some
studies of checkoff program effective-
ness calculate BCRs in terms of addi-
tional industry profits (i.e., the
increase in industry sales or cash
receipts net of additional production
costs) or producer surplus generated
per dollar invested in advertising and
promotion (i.e., a profit BCR or sur-
plus BCR).
Sales impact analyses are designed
to determine whether or not past
promotion expenditures have effec-
tively shifted out the demand and,
therefore, sales. If such analyses con-
clude that promotion expenditures
have not shifted out demand, then it
is likely from a statistical perspective
that the program has not benefited
those who have paid for the program.
However, even if such studies
indicate a positive demand impact,
the related increase in sales may or
may not translate into increased prof-
its of those who pay for the programs
for a variety of reasons as discussed
by Wohlgenant in another article in
this issue of Choices. Most impor-
tantly, the benefits of the program
may be captured by wholesalers, dis-
tributors, processors, importers, for-
eign producers, or others along the
commodity supply chain or even in
closely related markets that do not
contribute to the costs of the pro-
gram. For example, in an analysis of
the Florida orange juice promotion
program, the increase in orange juice
demand and price generated by the
program prompted an increase in
orange juice imports, which bene-
fited foreign orange growers and lim-
ited the benefits of the program to
Florida orange growers who pay for
the program.
Measuring the benefits of promo-
tion programs to those who pay for
them requires a more sophisticated
and dynamic type of commodity
market model than used for demand
and sales impact analyses. Because
most products pass through several
stages of processing before reaching
the final consumer, the markets asso-
ciated with these different stages are
interrelated at some level. In vertically
related markets, what happens in one
market or processing stage affects all
other markets or stages. Furthermore,
product processing often results in
by-products or joint products that
sell in entirely different markets. In
horizontally related markets, products
that are not directly in a processing
chain may be considered close substi-
tutes for products in the chain. At the
same time, some markets include for-
eign components. Market supply
may include imports and market
demand may consist of both domes-
tic and export demand. 
The intricacy of the interrelation-
ships among and between markets
means that a myriad of factors can
affect the transmission of the retail-
level effects of checkoff program
activities back to those who pay for
the program. Once the market for
the product has been accurately mod-
eled and the relative roles of the pro-
motion program activities and other
market forces at the various levels
along the supply chain have been
accounted for and incorporated into
the model, the process of measuring
the benefit of the promotion expen-
ditures to those who pay for the pro-
gram is done through scenario analy-
sis. This process is accomplished by
simulating the model over the histor-
ical period with and then without the
promotion expenditures included in
the model. The actual historical data
are taken to represent the “with pro-
motion” scenario. For the “without
promotion” scenario, the level of pro-
motion expenditures is first set to
zero in the model in each year over
the historical period. The model then
is simulated over that period to gen-
erate changes in the levels of the pro-
duction, consumption, trade, and
prices that would have existed over
time in the absence of any promotion
program.  The simulated differences
between the values of model variables
in the “with” and “without” promo-
tion scenarios provide direct mea-
sures of the historical effects of the
program on the market of the com-
modity being promoted.  The results
are used to calculate a BCR or an
IRR to represent the estimated
change in the aggregate profits of the
contributors that is attributable to
the checkoff promotion program. 
Beyond Measurement
Regardless of how program effective-
ness is defined and measured, check-
off programs often face the difficult
challenge of “selling” the results to
their stakeholders. Despite positive
measures of effectiveness, producers
and other contributors often find it
difficult to understand or believe the
results. The primary problem in con-
vincing program contributors that
positive evaluations of a checkoff
program are meaningful is that, while
the cost of checkoff programs to each
contributor is eminently observable
by them, the benefits of the programs
are not. While contributors can2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2) CHOICES 77
clearly see the effects of assessments
on their bottom lines, they have no
way of seeing the portion of their rev-
enues that are directly attributable to
programmatic activities. 
Evaluations of checkoff pro-
grams specifically are intended to
measure the portion of revenues at
various levels in the industry that can
be directly attributable to the check-
off programs. But in doing so,
researchers must compare actual reve-
nues or sales over some time period
to nebulous, intangible concepts like
“what might have been earned or
sold in the absence of the program.”
In other words, the results imply that
$2, $5, or $10 for every dollar they
were assessed are in their pockets, but
they just don’t know it because their
earnings would have been lower if the
checkoff program had not existed.
This concept has proved extremely
difficult to communicate to produc-
ers.
Compounding that problem is
the tendency of many checkoff pro-
gram staffs and boards to oversell the
actual and potential impacts of their
programs to insure a positive out-
come from producer referenda and
otherwise justify continuation of
their programs. Contributors come
to expect large impacts on prices and
profits because of the anecdotes they
have been told about how successful
various activities have been and how
large the benefits to them are from
contributing to the program. Esti-
mated BCRs much in excess of 1:1
often are taken to imply large abso-
lute impacts of a checkoff program
on the market. Nothing could be less
true. A BCR of 5:1 results by divid-
ing a $5 billion industry profit bene-
fit by a $1 billion checkoff invest-
ment or by dividing a $5 benefit by a
$1 investment. For most commodity
promotion programs, the value of the
expenditures in research and promo-
tion activities is extremely small in
comparison to the total value of
industry sales. Commodity promo-
tion expenditures generally amount
to a fraction of 1% of the total indus-
try sales each year. With such a low
level of investment compared to
sales, the overall impact of a com-
modity promotion program could
hardly be expected to be significant
in a practical sense in its effects on
production, prices, sales, and market
share even if the impact could be said
to be statistically significant.
When producers and other con-
tributors fail to see the large impact
on their returns that they have been
led to expect, they tend to disbelieve
the measured effectiveness of the
checkoff program. One potential
solution for checkoff program boards
and their staffs is to spend more time
educating producers on the true
potential of their programs. Perhaps
checkoff programs would be better
sold to contributors as tools to help
reduce downside pressure on prices
and profits in bad years and contrib-
ute to higher prices and profits in
good years rather than as panacea to
the financial problems they face.
Another potential solution is to
focus on appropriate measures of
“effectiveness” that more readily con-
vey the success or failure of checkoff
programs in meeting their objectives
to program contributors.  Benefit-
cost ratios as measures of effective-
ness have often proved to be less than
successful in that effort. Further
development of the internal rate of
return (IRR) methodology could lead
to a measure of effectiveness that
might be more easily interpreted by
program contributors. Strong argu-
ments also can be made for simple
price effects. In a competitive indus-
try, producers relate well to changes
in prices as a result of intervention.
Summing Up
Measuring the effectiveness of a com-
modity checkoff program begins
with understanding the promotion
objectives and then adopting an
appropriate measurement technique.
For checkoff organizations primarily
concerned with positively impacting
consumer attitudes and awareness
concerning their products, consumer
attitude and awareness studies are
sufficient for measuring program
effectiveness. New checkoff organiza-
tions often begin with this objective
believing that changing consumer
attitudes is the key to changing con-
sumer behavior, positively influenc-
ing retail sales, and eventually




whether their promotional efforts
have gone beyond any change in con-
sumer attitudes to actually shifting
out the demand for their commodi-
ties. Sales/demand impact studies are
designed to measure the retail level
impact of checkoff promotion pro-
grams. Such studies often report
aggregate measures of effectiveness
such as benefit-cost ratios or mar-
ginal rates of return. Sooner or later,
however, someone is going to ask:
“What am I getting for my checkoff
contribution?” The answer to such
questions requires more complex and
in-depth analyses to track the retail
level impact of advertising and pro-
motion programs back through the
supply chain to producers to measure
the effectiveness of retail-level pro-
motion programs in enhancing the
profitability and economic welfare of
producers and other contributors.
Once the effectiveness of the pro-
gram has been measured, however,
the checkoff program still faces the
challenge of communicating the78 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2006 • 21(2)
results to contributors. Even if the
program is deemed to be highly
effective, contributors are often skep-
tical of the magnitude of the results.
While they can readily observe the
costs of the program to them, the
benefits generated are an unobserv-
able component of their total revenue
stream. Checkoff program boards
and staffs often compound the prob-
lem by overselling the potential
impacts of their programs on
demand, prices, and profits, and by
implying that high estimated rates of
return imply large program impacts
on the market. One solution may be
for checkoff program managers to sell
their programs as collective efforts to
enhance positive market pressures
and moderate negative market pres-
sures rather than always shifting out
demand and boosting prices.
Another solution is for researchers to
focus on developing measures that
more readily convey the effectiveness
of checkoff programs such as the
internal rate of return.
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